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The Loving Analogy:
Race and the Early Same-Sex Marriage Debate
The American legal system is based in precedent and legal scholars often
rely upon a series of analogies in order to discuss and conceptualize the expansion
of equal protection to minority groups. In the early legal discourse surrounding
same-sex marriage scholars, activists, and lawyers often relied on drawing legal
and social parallels between Loving v. Virginia (1967) and early same-sex
marriage cases such as Baehr v. Lewin (2003). The arguments of the sameness of
race and sexuality were extremely controversial in legal discourse, though
effective in courts. Numerous scholars published articles in the years surrounding
the Baehr case disputing similarities and differences between race and sexuality
in law and society. The questions scholars raised were as follows: How should the
Loving decision be interpreted and should it apply to same-sex couples? How was
race used to carve out space in American legal structure for lesbian, gay, and
bisexual (LGB) rights?1 What was the impact of the “Loving analogy”—as it
came to be known—in legal, political, and social contexts for LGB people as well
as people of color?
Ultimately the Loving analogy was successful in making progress in the
courts to extend the protections of marriage to same-sex couples in some cases,
culminating in the national legalization of same-sex marriage in the landmark
case Obergefell v. Hodges (2015). But the analogy proved to be quite problematic
outside of the courtroom. Liberal scholars either supported the use of the
sameness argument because they accepted the analogous experiences of LGB
people and people of color or saw the Loving analogy as a necessary argument to
put forth in order to extend legal protection originally grounded in race.
Conservative scholars rejected the conflation of miscegenation and same-sex
marriage struggles by highlighting the differences between racial and sexual
minorities, moralizing the debatet, and arguing for a strictly racial characterization
of the Loving decision. Finally, some queer and black scholars argued that the
social implications of the Loving analogy have had harmful effects for the social
understandings of race and sexuality, while others argue that marriage is an
inherently racist and heterosexist institution for which LGB people of color
should not be advocating. There is little discursive history written about the
Loving analogy in the early marriage equality movement, but in exploring this
history we can see the effects of race law upon the legal regulation of marriage.
Furthermore, by understanding the legal and cultural effects of the sameness
argument in the early 1990s, scholars and lawyers today can amend the argument
1

I use lesbian, gay, and bisexual here because same-sex marriage plays out very differently in
discussion of trans people. For the sake of brevity and focus, and because the scholarship of the
early same-sex marriage debates marginalizes or ignores trans individuals, this paper will focus on
cisgender sexual minorities.
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(or abandon it entirely) in order to ensure that they are relying on the most
effective sociolegal strategy today.
Constructing the Analogy
In Loving v. Virginia the Court struck down anti-miscegenation laws
stating, “there can be no doubt that the restricting of the freedom to marry solely
because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause.”2 Because the law was restrictive based on racial
classifications the majority applied heightened scrutiny under equal protection
jurisprudence, resulting in the decriminalization of interracial marriage. The Court
went on to address the issue of due process deciding that, “The freedom to marry
has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness among men...the freedom to marry or not to marry a person
of another race resides within the individual and cannot be infringed by the
state.”3 Combining the heightened scrutiny jurisprudence of due process and
equal protection claims, the Court decided that not only must racially restrictive
laws fulfill a compelling state interest, but also that any law concerning the right
to marry must receive the same level of scrutiny.
Nearly thirty years after the Supreme Court struck down bans on mixedrace marriages three same-sex couples took their challenge to Supreme Court of
Hawaii. The plaintiffs argued that the equal protection and fundamental rights due
process precedents set in Loving should be applied to same-sex couples. In Baehr
v. Lewin (1993) the Court decided that same-sex marriage bans violated Hawaii’s
Equal Protection Clause due to sex-based discrimination, remanding the case to a
lower court to ensure that the state had compelling enough interest to withstand
heightened scrutiny.4 In this decision the Court gave legitimacy to the Loving
analogy by applying the same equal protection jurisprudence to same-sex couples
that was afforded to mixed-race couples in Loving. Paradoxically, The Hawaiian
Supreme Court recognized “the state's acknowledged stewardship over the
institution of marriage, the extent of permissible state regulation of the right of
access to the marital relationship is subject to constitutional limitations or
constraints.”5 Thus the Court incorporated the Loving analogy into law, but did
2

Loving v. Virginia 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
Ibid.
4
Baehr v. Lewin (1993).
Baehr was interpreted through the Hawaiian constitution which required strict scrutiny for laws
that discriminated on the basis of sex, at the time federal constitutional jurisprudence was still
developing intermediate scrutiny for sex based discrimination, see: United States v. Virgina 518
U.S. 515 (1996), Craig v. Boren, 499 U.S. 190 (1976). For commentary on Baehr v. Lewin see
Chauncey Why marriage, From the closet to the alter, Deitrich “The lessons of the Law: Same-Sex
Marriage and Baehr v. Lewin.” Wolfson “Why Marriage Matters” Frank “Law and the Gay Rights
Story”
5
Baehr v. Lewin (1993).
3

http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/puhistorian/vol8/iss1/4

2

Walburn: The Loving Analogy: Race and the Early Same-Sex Marriage Debate

not extend marriage rights to same-sex couples by mitigating the due process
claim. Though the case did not result in an immediate shift in the jurisprudence of
marriage, Baehr gave credibility to the Loving analogy and resulted in the
opportunity to assert this precedent in the courts.

A Tale of Two Precedents: Due Process and Equal Protection
Much of the legal discourse surrounding the thirtieth anniversary Loving,
which roughly coincided with the first successful claims for same-sex marriage,
surrounded the characterization and application of Loving v. Virginia. The
decision rested on two areas of analysis; first, the Court decided that racially
based restrictions violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In interpreting this part of the decision, many scholars argued that
Loving should be classified as a racially specific case that applied the Brown v.
Board of Education (1954) desegregation rationale to marriage.6 However, some
legal commentators noted that the Court also looked at the case through a due
process lens, applying strict scrutiny to the anti-miscegenation statue for two
reasons: the racial basis of the law which upheld white supremacy as well as the
restriction of marriage, a fundamental human right. The characterization of the
Loving decision as either pertaining to race or marriage was an important factor
shaping how legal scholars conceptualized the Loving analogy and its role in the
same-sex marriage debates.
The main distinction between liberal and conservative views of the power
and validity of the Loving analogy centered on how the case should be classified,
and what legal precedent it set. Liberal commentators tended to view the Loving
decision as a combination between equal protection of all protected categories
(i.e. race, sex, national origin, alienage, and nonmarital parentage) and the due
process protection of the fundamental right to marriage.7 In this view liberal
proponents of legalizing same-sex marriage viewed the loving analogy as a
legitimate precedential assertion that was legal justification for same-sex
marriage. These scholars employed the Loving analogy to make claims based in
sex-based discrimination and assert that same-sex marriage bans should receive
heightened scrutiny.8 Using I Love Lucy as an example, Andrew Koppleman
explained the sex-based discrimination ideology as follows: if Lucy loves Ricky,
6

Michael F. Higginbotham, Race Law: Cases, Commentary, and Questions Third ed. (Durham:
Carolina Academic Press, 2010), 494. David Orgon Coolidge, “Playing the Loving Card: SameSex Marriage and the Politics of Analogy,” B.Y.U Journal of Public Law 12 (1998), 217-230.
Robert A. Destro, “Law and the Politics of Marriage: Loving v. Virginia after 30 Years
Introduction,” Catholic University Law Review 47 (1998): 1213-1218.
7
Kenji Yoshino, “The New Equal Protection,” Harvard Law Review 124 (2011), 756-757.
8
I use the term “heightened” scrutiny because it was unclear what scrutiny sex-based
discrimination would require at the time of Baehr and varied state to state. See note 4.
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they may marry. But if Lucy loves Ethel, she is denied marriage strictly on the
basis of sex.9 In order to tie this to the Loving analogy, he then argued,
“miscegenation laws discriminated on the basis of race…in order to maintain
white supremacy. Similarly sodomy laws discriminate on the basis of sex…in
order to impose traditional sex roles.”10 This argument would allow the courts to
apply heightened scrutiny, as they did in Baehr, relying on the jurisprudence of
sex-based discrimination. This argument proved to be strategically important
because an equal protection claim based in sexual orientation would receive only
rational review.
In his dissent in Bowers v Hardwick (1986), which affirmed anti-sodomy
statutes, Justice Blackmun commented on the Loving analogy and sex
discrimination claims in LGB rights litigation. Voicing the liberal analysis of the
Loving analogy, Blackmun wrote that “the parallel between Loving and this case
is almost uncanny,” citing the sodomy and anti-miscegenation laws’ religious
justifications and widespread similar regulations.11 The cases differed legally,
however, as Loving involved the due process claim to marriage rights whereas
Bowers involved sex acts, which did not receive due process protection in the
Bowers case. Marriage equality cases provided a space where equal protection
and due process could converge to incorporate same-sex couples into the
jurisprudence put forth by Loving v. Virginia. Thus, liberals argued, racial
arguments for equal protection and challenging white supremacist laws pertaining
to marriage gave an example and legitimate legal framework for the recognition
of same-sex marriage.
Conservative pundits vehemently opposed the liberal validation of the
Loving analogy and wrote extensively on the topic throughout the 1990s. Indeed,
in November 1997 The Catholic University of America, the Howard University
School of Law, and the J. Reuben Clack School of Law at Brigham Young
University sponsored a conference called “Law and the Politics of Marriage:
Loving v. Virginia After 30 Years.”12 Out of this conference came a flood of
articles and scholarship that denounced the Loving analogy as “unpersuasive,”
“superficial,” and “inapposite.”13 Conservatives typically relied on the
characterization of the Loving decision as exclusively racial and based in equal
protection, ignoring or dismissing the due process arguments of marriage as a
fundamental human right. For example, Robert Destro maintained that the
Andrew Koppleman, “Why Discrimination against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex
Discrimination,” New York University Law Review, 69 (1994): 197.
10
Koppleman, Andrew “The miscegenation analogy: Sodomy law as sex discrimination” The Yale
Law Journal 98 (1988): 147.
11
Bowers v. Hardwick, 487 U.S. 211 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
12
Destro, “Law and the Politics of Marriage,” 1218.
13
Richard F. Duncan, “From Loving to Romer: Homosexual Marriage and Moral Discernment,”
Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law 12 (1998): 240-251.
9
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argument that Loving could be applied to what he called “homosexual ‘marriage’”
strayed from the fundamentally racial aspect of the case.14 Another scholar argued
that the decision in Loving was aimed at erasing the white supremacist vestiges of
eugenics and promoting integration, to appropriate the equal protection
jurisprudence of the case and apply it to same-sex marriage was antithetical to the
intent of the Loving. In fact, he claimed that mixed-sex marriages resulted in an
effective integration of the sexes.15 In this line of reasoning, mixed-sex marriages
maintained the intent of the Loving decision by promoting integration of the
sexes, treating both equally, whereas same-sex marriages are innately
segregationist, the very characteristic that the Loving decision overturned. These
claims maintained that race-based classifications are different and irreconcilable
with sex-based discrimination while focusing on equal protection jurisprudence.
At the same time, instead of relying on an equal protection analysis of Loving,
some conservative scholars directly disputed the due process claim to marriage
and the meaning of the Loving analogy as a whole.
Though many conservative commentators relied upon the omission of a
definitive decision on the due process claims to same-sex marriages in Baehr to
deny application of strict scrutiny to same-sex marriage, one scholar used the due
process claim to strengthen his counter-argument to the Loving analogy. David
Orgon Coolidge discussed the Loving analogy as an inappropriate politicization of
the legal debate. He equated the use of the analogy to “playing the race card” in
other debates. Coolidge argued that invoking the right of interracial couples to
marry in the early same-sex marriage debate was “playing the loving card,” that is
to say proponents who used the analogy were employing a politically charged
tactic that was an inexact parallel.16 In Coolidge’s argument, the analogy
“invoke[d] race, civil rights, and the freedom to marry while simultaneously
painting one’s opponents as the Bull Connors of the 1990s.”17 In this analysis
proponents of the Loving analogy were drawing on existing tensions and an
emotionally charged issue in order to evoke civil rights-based sympathy and
disarm opponents. Coolidge denounced the analogy as “a subtle way of telling
people that they are no different than a bunch of Jim Crow racists, and ought to be
ashamed of themselves—so ashamed that they should get out of the way and
leave the definition of marriage to the courts.”18 In this analysis one can see that
in Coolidge’s view, those who were against same-sex marriage were protecting
the definition of marriage rather than maintaining heterosexual dominance.

Destro, “Law and the Politics of Marriage,” 1216-1222.
Duncan “Homosexual Marriage and moral Discernment,” 243-244.
16
Coolidge, “Playing the Loving Card,” 201-205.
17
Ibid, 201.
18
Ibid, 205. Emphasis added
14
15
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Indeed, Coolidge’s primary concern was the definition of marriage, and he
used this technical argument to strike down the due process claims central to the
Loving analogy. He reasoned that while Loving extended the existing legal
institution of marriage to interracial couples, the legalization of same-sex
marriage would require a redefinition of the institution of marriage altogether.19
His view of same-sex marriage as a radical departure from the traditional legal
definition meant that same-sex couples were not fighting for marriage but
something else entirely, and that something was not protected under due process
jurisprudence. This point was underscored by the fact that Coolidge referred to
same-sex marriage by placing “marriage” in quotation marks, as if to question or
even mock the idea that marriage could be extended to same-sex couples. In this
way, conservative scholars were able to call upon the definition of marriage in
order to reject due process claims to same-sex marriages. However, the Loving
analogy was not confined to law reviews or the courtroom; though much of the
discourse surrounding the Loving analogy was entrenched in legal interpretation
and meaning, there were social arguments surrounding the controversial use of the
analogy.
Morality and Critiques of the Loving Analogy
Though much of the discourse comparing and contrasting race and
sexuality took place in strictly legal discussions, law exists within social context
and often gives institutional power to social norms and understandings. Race and
sexuality are sociolegal fictions, themselves; that is to say that they are social
constructions that are validated and given meaning by law.20 Therefore legal
theorists often discussed social norms, specifically morality, when considering the
parallels and discrepancies of race and sexual orientation. Liberal commentators
tended to cite similarities between the moral dissidents of mixed-race and samesex couples. Josephine Ross, for example, compared the two in order to lend
credibility to the Loving analogy. She began her analysis by citing cases of the
sexualization of interracial couples at the time of the Loving case to that of samesex relationships in the early 1990s.21 Ross explained that this sexualization
meant that the love of mixed-race couples in the 1970s was seen as pornographic
and inherently tied to subversive sex, which was mirrored by same-sex
relationships in the early 1990s, thus devaluating those relationships and their
love. Furthermore, Ross argued, parents and outsiders reacted to same-sex
19

Ibid, 220.
Michael Foucault, The History of Sexuality (New York: Random House, 1990), Higgenbotham
Race Law: Cases, Commentary, and Questions, 2-99, Siobhan B. Somerville, Queering the Color
Line: Race and the Invention of Homosexuality in American Culture (Durham: Duke University
Press, 2000).
21
Josephine Ross, “The Sexualization of Difference: A comparison of Mixed-Race and SameGender Marriage,” Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 37 (2002): 255-288.
20
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couples and mixed-race couples in similar ways. In both situations studies showed
that parents often asked what they did wrong and mourned the real or perceived
loss of familial status. Outsiders influenced both mixed-race and same-sex
couples by reacting with real or threatened violence, resulting in “closeted”
relationships.22 Liberal proponents of the Loving analogy lent credibility to the
parallels between racial and sexual discrimination in the courtroom by
comparable lived experiences of racism and heterosexism.
Conservative commentators, however, used similar social applications to
invoke morality in order to discredit the Loving analogy. These arguments
implicitly relied upon the idea that race is a social classification forced upon
someone through a structure of legal taxonomies whereas sexuality is either
pathological, chosen, or the result of moral failings. Richard F. Duncan argued
that “Loving is a case in which public morality triumphed over social
pathology.”23 His view was that the social and legal manifestations of white
supremacy were a moral failing; the Court overcame this failing by striking down
racialized measures criminalizing mixed-race marriages. However, individuals
who were morally flawed were appropriating the jurisprudence put forth in
Loving. Duncan warned “The legacy of Loving is threatened today by those who
seek to use the courts to accomplish a radical and dangerous agenda—the
reordering of marriage to reflect the alleged equal goodness of homosexuality and
heterosexuality.”24 Notice his underlying judgment that heterosexuality is good
and homosexuality is not, thus moralizing the argument. Therefore, Duncan
argued that while Loving was a moral triumph over social perversion, the Loving
analogy was an immoral appropriation of this righteous ruling resulting in a moral
threat to society and law.
The societal ideal of sexual choice rather than identity had legal
ramifications as well. The Ninth Circuit Court’s Decision in High Tech Gays v
Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (1990) was a clear example of the
legal consequences of perceived sexual choice. The Court stated, “Homosexuality
is not an immutable characteristic, it is behavioral and hence fundamentally
different from traits such as race, gender or alienage…The behavior or conduct
of such already recognized classes is irrelevant to their identification.”25 This
jurisprudence legitimized moral judgments of homosexuality as a character flaw
or immoral behavior and codified it into law. When judges dismissed sexual
identity and promoted the idea of behavior, they rejected any possibility of equal
Ross, “The Sexualization of Difference,” 274-278.
Duncan “Homosexual Marriage and Moral Discernment,” 239.
24
Ibid. Emphasis added.
25
High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office quoted in Walther Frank Law
and the Gay Rights Story: The Long Search for Equal Justice in a Divided Democracy (New
Brunswik: Rutgers, 2014), 104. Emphasis added.
22
23
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protection jurisprudence extending to LGB people. Further, when equal protection
was denied to LGB people on moral grounds, it inhibited the use of the Loving
analogy, and rendered it obsolete in court. Though many liberal and conservative
commentators were discussing the impact of social understandings on law, many
leftist queer, and black scholars argued that the employment of the analogy in the
court room had detrimental social implications.

Is The Loving Analogy Racist?
Often, while white lawyers, scholars, and LGB individuals employed the
Loving analogy to further the marriage equality struggle, radical queer and black
scholars denounced this trend as a harmful appropriation and a specifically white
goal.26 When discussing the pitfalls of the Loving analogy as employed in the
early 1990s many queer and black scholars pointed to the fact that the comparison
had very problematic effects on the public perception of the intersections of race
and sexuality. Some leftist commentators argued that the analogy was overly
simplistic because it ignored intersectionality while others argued that marriage
itself was a racist institution that LGB people should not fight for. These critiques
appeared in multiple law reviews, though they were marginalized by the
normative, legalistic debates outlined above.
One of the major critiques leftist scholars put forth was that the Loving
analogy construed racial minorities and sexual minorities as mutually exclusive
groups, erasing queer people of color entirely. For example, one queer legal
scholar argued, “Specifically, the comparative approach marginalizes (or treats as
nonexistent) gays and lesbians of color, leading to a narrow construction of the
gay and lesbian community as largely upper-class and white.”27 This
characterization of the LGB community as largely white reinforced the mutually
exclusive categories of racial minorities and sexual minorities while
simultaneously ignoring those who identified with both groups. Not only was this
construction a misrepresentation, but it also resulted in harmful ideologies, which
perpetuated racism and heterosexism, to permeate conversations of race and
sexuality.
I use the term “queer” to describe these scholars as that identity and the field of Queer Theory is
often more radical and leftist, separating from the liberal/conservative dichotomy used by many
white LGB commentators. For more on Queer Theory and its radical approaches against
mainstream gay rights see Against Equality: Queer Revolution Not Mere Inclusion, ed. Ryan
Conrad (Oakland: AK Press) 2014, That’s Revolting: Queer Strategies for Resisting Assimilation,
ed. Mattilda Bernstein Sycamore (Berkeley: Soft Skull Press) 2004, and Cathy J. Cohen “Punks,
Bulldaggers, and Welfare Queens: The Radical Potential of Queer Politics?” GLQ: A Journal of
Lesbian and Gay Studies 3 (1997):437-456.
27
Darren Laenard Hutchinson, “’Gay Rights’ for ‘Gay Whites?’?: Race, Sexual Identity, and
Equal Protection Discourse,” Cornell Law Review 85 (2000): 1360.
26
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The construction of mutually exclusive categories of race and sexuality led
to harmful assumptions by straight people of color and white LGB people. Queer
legal scholar, Catherine Smith argued, that the assertion of sameness between
people of color and LGB people had two negative consequences. First, the
analogy allowed “white LGBT people to deny the white privilege and racism of
white people generally and of themselves as members of the white majority.”28
The Loving analogy, therefore, ignored the fact that many LGB people benefitted
from their white privilege, instead creating the idea that all forms of oppression
(racism, sexism, heterosexism, etc.) were experienced in the same way. Second, it
ignored the fact that straight people of color could be homophobic and experience
heterosexual privilege, preventing empathetic connections between straight
people of color and white LGB people. In this view, the Loving analogy, in fact,
alienated people of color from supporting LGB rights as it placed them in direct
opposition to the gay community. Smith argued that a conversation about the
Loving analogy “descends into a sameness-difference debate, reinforces white
racism, and overlooks heterosexist and sexist stereotypes.”29 Though the Loving
analogy was important in the courtroom, the social impact of the argument was
detrimental to the possible alliance of straight people of color and white LGB
people to fight systematic oppression as a whole. Though some queer
commentators were discussing the pitfalls of using the sameness argument, others
were saying that marriage equality itself was more problematic than the rhetorical
tools gay rights advocates employed to achieve it.
Black queer radicals sometimes argued that same-sex marriage as a goal
was a racist objective that white LGB people used to obtain more systematic
privilege. Scholars often argued that same-sex marriage privileged a white
supremacist version of family over the traditional and cultural definition claimed
by many black families. For example Mattie Udora Richardson cited the historical
trend of casting black families as pathological and dysfunctional, focusing on
the1965 Department of Labor assessment known as the Moynihan Report.30
Richardson states, “Marriage has been used against African American people,
held as an impossible standard of two-parent nuclear household that pathologizes
the extended families that are integral to African ancestral and African American
cultural lives.”31 Same-sex marriage would only maintain this privileged ideal of
family including only two people and their children, excluding the black family of
extended kin networks by assimilating same-sex couples to a white, heterosexist
definition of family. The fact that marriage equality had moved to the forefront of
Catherine Smith “Queer as Black Folk?” Wisconsin Law Review 379 (2007): 389.
Smith “Queer as Black Folk?” 391.
30
Kenyon Farrow, “Is Gay Marriage Anti-Black???” in Against Equality: Queer Revolution Not
Mere Inclusion, ed. Ryan Conrad, (Oakland: AK Press, 2014): 113.
31
Ibid, 114.
28
29
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the LGB rights movement showed a great disparity between the needs queer
people of color and those of the white gay people in positions of power.
Because of the institutional advantage that white LGB people claimed and
the false straight-black/gay-white dichotomy, most LGBT organizations were
overwhelming white. Therefore, organizations such as the Human Rights
Campaign and the Log Cabin Republicans focused strictly on LGB rights,
ignoring the effects of racism on queer people of color. One scholar noted, “With
some exceptions, white LGBT organizations and advocates often ask much of
black people without doing much to confront racism.”32 This alienated queer
people of color by showing that the LGB community was fighting for their white
brothers and sisters and leaving queer people of color outside the mainstream
movement. Thus, not only was the Loving analogy detrimental to societal
understandings of race and sexuality, but white LGB people employed the
comparison to achieve an inherently white supremacist end.
The Legacy of the Loving Analogy
The debate over the Loving analogy did not end with the new millennium,
but continues to permeate same-sex marriage discourse today. Indeed, in the oral
arguments before the United States Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges,
which challenged the constitutionality of state same-sex marriage bans, both sides
of the bar drew upon the Loving analogy. For example, Justice Kagan asked the
respondents, “Now, the right to marry. We had Loving...We just said there’s a
right to marry, that is fundamental and that everybody is entitled to it unless there
is some good reason for the state to exclude [them]. So why shouldn’t we adopt
the exact same understanding here?”33 In this question Justice Kagan was
invoking the same due process arguments as liberal commentators of the 1990s.
She then went on to dismiss the characterization of the Loving decision as strictly
racial, instead invoking an individual liberty argument. She asked the respondent
“And in, indeed, Loving was exactly what this case is. It’s a case which shows
how liberty and – and equality are intertwined, wasn’t it?”34 Though the liberty
and equality argument was less discussed in the early Loving analogy discourse,
this demonstrates the continued invocation of the comparison in order to extend
protections to same-sex couples. The incorporation of individual liberties and
their entanglement to equality in this employment of the Loving analogy
demonstrated that it was evolving to become more effective in the legal sphere.
Throughout the oral arguments Loving was invoked ten times between the parties,
the justices asked about its applicability, the petitioners called upon it as
precedent as earlier liberal scholars had done, and the respondents countered this
point with similar arguments as those used by conservatives in the 1990s.
Smith “Queer as Black Folk?” 393.
Justice Elena Kagan, Obergefell v. Hodges oral arguments. April 28, 2015. 75.
34
Ibid.
32
33
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The decision of the Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, penned by Justice
Kennedy, ultimately declared same-sex marriage legal in all states. In the majority
opinion, Kennedy drew upon Loving to support the due process jurisprudence that
claimed marriage as a fundamental right.35 Similarly, the Court put forth that,
“Loving did not ask about a ‘right to interracial marriage,’” but “about the right to
marry in its comprehensive sense.’”36 In employing the loving analogy in this
manner Kennedy ensured that this case was not considered to claim a right to
same-sex marriage, but a right for same-sex couples to marry. He, therefore,
disarmed the argument that there was no guarantee to “gay marriage” or that
marriage between two people of the same sex was not “marriage” at all. As the
opinion progressed to address the equal protection issue at hand, Kennedy took up
the Loving analogy again, stating “In Loving the Court invalidated a prohibition
on interracial marriage under both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due
Process Clause. The Court first declared the prohibition invalid because of its
unequal treatment of interracial couples.”37 Therefore, in the decision that
effectively delegitimized bans on same-sex marriage, the majority opinion
employed both of the key precedential arguments of the Loving analogy. In doing
so the decision recounted many of the rhetorical and legal strategies of liberals in
the early marriage equality debate.
The dissenters, on the other hand, pointed to the inconsistencies between
Obergefell and Loving. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Scalia and Justice
Thomas, maintained that same-sex marriage was not marriage at all, quoting
Loving itself, because, “We later described marriage as ‘fundamental to our very
existence and survival,’ an understanding that necessarily implies a procreative
component.”38 Such rhetoric was quite different from earlier conservative
condemnations of same-sex marriage. Conservatives in the early debate claimed
that homosexuality was not an identity, but an immoral choice. The conservative
jurisprudence in the 2015 Obergefell decision did not take up the question of
immorality or choice and instead relied on the definition of marriage as a
procreative union. Though the exact points of disagreement shifted over two
decades, the need to weaken or disprove the Loving analogy remained an
important legal issue. Thus the Loving analogy continues to permeate American
legal culture through equal protection and due process jurisprudence in
discussions surrounding same-sex marriage.
The American legal structure relies upon the use of precedent and analogy,
especially in the area of extending equal protection and due process rights to
underrepresented groups. The use of analogy can be a powerful tool to carve out
35

Obergefell v. Hodges 576___ U.S. (2015), 11.
Ibid, 18.
37
Ibid, 19-20.
38
Obergefell v. Hodges 576___ (2015), Justice Roberts Dissenting, 7.
36
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space for minority classes to gain protected status, as is the case with the Loving
analogy. Conservative and Liberal legal scholars often debated the classification
of Loving as equal protection of race or fundamental rights due process in order to
discuss its applicability to the same-sex marriage cases in the early 1990’s. By
considering race and sexuality concrete legal categorizations, these arguments
strengthened the sociolegal fictions of race, sexuality, and marriage. The legalistic
debates centered on the validity of the sameness argument in the courtroom, but
conversations about the social implications of the analogy permeated the Loving
discourse as well.
Because law and society are deeply intertwined and influence one another,
many commentators were discussing the validity of the Loving analogy in the
social sphere. While legal scholars argued about precedent, legalistic taxonomies,
and the interpretation of the Loving decision, others were concerned with the
effects that the analogy had on social ideologies of race and sexuality.
Conservative scholars argued that sexuality and race could not be compared due
to the moral implications of homosexuality and highlighted behavior over
identity. This social understanding permeated the jurisprudence of same-sex
marriage decisions. Queer and black scholars, however, argued that the analogy
had harmful effects for straight people of color, white LGB people, and queer
people of color. In this view, the use of analogy, while sometimes effective in the
courts, was inappropriate and had adverse social effects. Finally, some queer
black commentators claimed the goal of marriage equality itself was racially
restrictive and served to assimilate queer people of color to an exclusively white
family ideal.
The Loving analogy carved out space in equal protection and due process
jurisprudence to subsume LGB people and same-sex couples under existing legal
protections. The comparison also conflated race and sexual minority struggles and
shaped public understandings of race, sexuality, and the law. The arguments
surrounding the analogy reveal the contentious debates that permeated legal and
social discourse, while also providing an example of the deep connectedness
between the law and society. The Loving analogy is a controversial but integral
part of LGB legal history and continues to be a vital tool in the same-sex marriage
jurisprudence today.
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